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NOTES
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT
Out of the following factual situation arose two law suits,
the former being by an injured third party in tort and the
latter being by the employee's beneficiary under the Work-
man's Compensation Law:' On February 27, 1943, Walter
Falconer, employed by Beard-Laney, Inc., as a truck driver,
arrived in Rock Hill, South Carolina, from Charlotte, North
Carolina, with instructions to deliver a tank load of 4,300
gallons of gasoline. After delivering something over 1,500
gallons Falconer suddenly drove away with the unloading
hose dangling from the truck, with gasoline spurting from
it. Testimony was to the effect that Falconer was drinking
at that time and that his stated intention was to go to York
to fill a date. At the instance of another motorist Falconer
stopped his truck, alighted, and went to the rear of the truck
and cut the flow of the gasoline. Another witness who had
seen Falconer stop the truck and cut off the gasoline stated
that no visible signs of intoxication were present. Falconer
proceeded to McConnellsville and then on to York. At a point
entering York, on a curve, Falconer overturned resulting in
an explosion. Falconer was found in the cab of the truck
burned beyond recognition. The truck had set fire to two
houses. Evidence disclosed that there were frequent accidents
at this curve due to faulty road construction. The route Falc-
oner was taking would have caused him to travel 55 miles in
order to return to Charlotte from Rock Hill, while the shortest
route to Charlotte was only 28 miles. Also, the expressed in-
structions of Beard-Laney, Inc., were to the effect that there
would be no drinking by employees while working.
In the former case, the owner of one of the houses which
was set afire by the explosion of Falconer's truck, sued Beard-
Laney, Inc., for damages sustained. The jury rendered a ver-
dict for the Plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court of this
state found that Falconer had not gone outside the scope of his
1. S. C. CODE OF LAws, §7035 (1942).
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employment. Nevertheless, this decision was not rendered
without much controversy, there being three justices in favor
of the affirmance and two justices dissenting.2
In the latter case the plaintiff, the daughter of Walter
Falconer, presented a claim against the defendants under the
Workmen's Compensation Law. The Industrial Commission
heard the case and found as facts that Falconer was not so
intoxicated that such intoxication was the proximate cause
of the accident and that Falconer was at the time of the acci-
dent, acting within the scope of his employment, the accident
'"arising out of" and "in the course of" his employment. On
appeal the Circuit Court sustained the findings of the Indus-
trial Commission. On appeal, the Supreme Court of this state
reversed this decision holding that the deceased, Walter Falc-
oner, had gone beyond the scope of his employment and that
there was no evidence reasonably warranting the inference
that Falconer's death arose out of and in the course of his
employment. 3
The master has long been liable for the tortious injury,
by his servant, of a third party. Plato provided that the wrong-
doing slave should be given up to the injured party or that
the master should recompense the injured party for his in-
jury.4 On the other hand, the courts have refused to allow re-
covery by the third party where the servant embarks on a
frolic of his own and injures the third party.5 Nevertheless,
the application of a given set of facts to these rules has long
been a perplexing problem. Some courts have set rules for
the determination of what facts may constitute a frolic.6
Other courts, as this court has done, have upheld the findings
of the jury that the servant had merely deviated from his duty
and hence was not acting outside the scope of his employ-
ment.7 South Carolina courts maintain that it is a question of
fact for the jury to determine whether a servant had merely
deviated or had departed so substantially that he was acting
outside the scope of his employment, except where there is no
testimony upon which a jury could base a verdict for a plain-
2. Carroll v Beard-Laney, Inc., 207 S. C. 339, 35 S. E. (2d) 425 (1945).
3. Falconer v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 54 S. E. (2d) 904 (S. C. 1949).
4. HOLMES, THE COMOiN LAW, 7 (1881).
5. Knight v. Laurens Motor Car Co., 108 S. C. 179, 93 S. E. 869 (1917).
6. See 122 A. L. R. 854; 116 A. L. R. 1381.
7. See Note 2, supra.
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tiff, in which case a directed verdict would be proper.8 The
latter case recognized that this doctrine of respondect su-
perior, however, was formulated and designed for the pro-
tection of "innocent third parties from the acts of agents to
whom the principal has entrusted the means of committing
an injury."
On the other hand, the suit by the servant for his injury,
regardless of his master's fault, is much newer relatively,
having begun in Germany in 1884.9 It is the result of the In-
dustrial Age coming into its own and the development of
sociological ideas which would pass the burden upon industry
of caring for the injured employee and his dependents. "The
Workmen's Compensation Act is a complete departure from
the common law with respect to liability for injury. It is a
revolt therefrom and the creation of a complete substitute
therefor, and not a mere improvement therein."10 In prac-
tically all of these statutes, there is a clause excluding the
employee from recovery, if the injury did not arise "out of
and in the course of the employment."" Early cases in deal-
ing with the interpretation of this clause dealt harshly with
the employee by strict construction. Later courts construed
the statutes in favor of the worker, basing it on the ground
that the statute was intended to benefit the worker and should
be construed liberally in his favor. "Liberal construction of
this beneficient remedial law, to which this court is committed
requires for its fruition, liberal application to doubtful facts.
Claims should not be denied upon technicalities."12 Neverthe-
less, the South Carolina Courts in construing the Workmen's
Compensation Law of South Carolina have stated that a claim-
ant must show that he sustained an injury by accident, arising
"out of" and in the "course of" his employment, in order to
make his claim compensable and bring it within the provisions
8. Holder v. Haynes, 193 S. C. 176, 7 S. E. (2d) 833 (1940).
9. HOROVITZ, CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 468
(1947).
10. Heiliger v. City of Sheldon, 236 Iowa 146, 18 N. W. (2d) 182
(1945).
11. S. C. CODE OF LAWS, §7035-2 (f) (1942).
12. Baltimore and Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S.
408 (1931); Gordon v. Hollywood-Beaufort Package Corp., 213 S. C.
438, 49 S. E. (2d) 718 (1948).
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of the Workmen's Compensation Law.13 Also, the burden is
on the claimant to show that the injury did arise "out of" and
in the "course of" his employment.14 After such evidence is
presented, each case must stand or fall on its own peculiar
merits. 5 Obviously on account of the great variety of cases,
it is impossible to establish an invariable rule * * ,"1a
However it has been said, "The death of the employee usually
deprives the dependent of his best witness-the employee
himself- and, especially where the accident is unwitnessed,
some latitute should be given the claimant."'17 Much the same
as the suit by an injured third party in which the jury de-
termines if the servant deviated, the South Carolina courts
place upon the Industrial Commission, as a fact finding body,
the duty of determining if the servant departed from his
duty so as not to be acting within the scope of the employ-
ment. "It is the well settled law of this state that if there is
any competent evidence to support the findings of the In-
dustrial Commission, such findings are conclusive on appeal,"
and "Where there is a conflict in the evidence, either of dif-
ferent witnesses, or of the same witness, the findings of fact of
the Industrial Commission as triers of fact, are conclusive."' 8
As to liberal construction of the statute it is also said that
the statute should be fairly, reasonably and liberally con-
strued in order to effectuate the legislative intent to afford
compensation for an injured employee and the others to bene-
fit, rather than strictly and technically construed in order to
deny compensation. 9 . Also, "It is frequently necessary in de-
ciding such questions of law (on appeal) to review the facts of
the case as they appear in the record, but this court may not
pass upon the force and effect of such facts." 20 The present
13. Spearman v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 188 S. C. 393, 199 S. E.
530 (1938).
14. Green v. City of Bennettsville, 197 S. C. 313, 15 S. E. (2d) 334
(1941).
15. Dicks v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 208 S. C. 139, 37 S. E. (2d) 286
(1946).
16. Cyrus v. Miller Tire Service, 208 S. C. 545, 38 S. E. (2d) 761
(1946).
17. HoRovITz, CURRENT TRENDS IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 631
(1947).
18. Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S. C. 157, 14 S. E. (2d) 889 (1941).
19. Pelfrey v. Oconee County, 207 S. C. 433, 36 S. E. (2d) 297 (1945).
20. Murdaugh v. Robert Lee Const. Co., 185 S. C. 497, 194 S. E. 447
(1937); Phillips v. Dixie Stores, Inc., 186 S. C. 374, 195 S. E. 646 (1938).
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trend, as indicated by current cases, legislation, and text
writers is to favor and benefit the employee. "However, the
unending stream of appeals * * * on the ground that
injuries do 'not arise out of' the employment, will never abate
so long as some courts will inject antiquated common law
rules into a new law which intended once and for all to bury
the :narrow rules of the common law as related to work in-
juries."2'
In the two cases arising out of Falconer's accident the
facts are practically the same, except for the testimony of one
individual, that testimony being by one Morrison who testi-
fied as to some short cuts that Falconer could have taken.
However, as was stated in the dissenting opinion to that case,
it did not appear from any evidence that Falconer took any
short cuts or even knew of any. Even if these short cuts over
second class dirt roads had saved Falconer a distance of 7
miles, his total departure would still have been 20 miles. So it
would appear irrelevant to the decision in either case, assum-
ing it had been shown that Falconer knew of any short cuts.
Therefore, it is inconceivable to the writer that such testi-
mony standing abstractly alone could be the basis for the
court upholding the jury's verdict in the former case and
the absence of such inconsequental testimony in the latter
case result in the upsetting of the findings of the Industrial
Commission.
The question in both cases is the same: Was Falconer at
the time of the accident performing an act arising "out of"
and "in the course of" his employment? Perhaps the only true
justifications for conflicting answers to this question are to
be found in the origin of the law in each case. The origin of
the law in the Carroll v. Beard-Laney, Inc., case was the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. The law favors the innocent
third party who is injured by means of an act of an employee
acting with an instrument placed in his hands. However, the
jury determines if there are any facts from which it may be
inferred that the servant was on a frolic and was not acting
in the interest of the master. The courts do not overrule the
decisions of the jury in most cases. There must be a total lack
of evidence from which the jury could have reached a decision,
before the court will overrule the jury's finding. Consequently,
21. HoRovITz, CURRENT TRENDs iN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATI N, 662
(1947).
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